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Original Lending Activities
T
HEsize and uniqueness of the task confronting the Home Own-
ers' Loan Corporation were far from fully understood when it
began operations. It was certain, however, that the demand for loans
would be large and that a nationwide organization had to be estab-
lished to do a new kind of job, the specifications of which were far
from precise. Although the situation called for quick action, little
preplanning had been completed when the Home Owners' Loan Act
was signed by the President on June 13, 1933.1 The Federal Home
Loan Bank Board, which was responsible for the Corporation's or-
ganization, immediately selected a few top personnel. It also began
to establish offices for each state, and began the staffing of 208 branch
offices and the selection of at least one local part-time fee attorney
and fee appraiser foreach of the nation's more than 3,000 counties.
Officials of state offices were at• first given almost complete autonomy.
in selecting staff members. Since each was required to report directly
to Washington, effective supervision was virtually impossible.2
The Corporation had several things in its favor in this early or-
ganizational stage: prominent among these was the fact that its status
as an independent corporation gave it far more budgetary freedom
than was enjoyed by regular government agencies. Furthermore, the
HOLC Act had omitted any mention of methods of administration,
thus giving the HOLC wide freedom in planning its actions. Exemp-
tion from civil service regulations, coupled with the vast amount of
1 Much of the material necessary to reconstruct fully the early history of the Cor-
poration—notably the record of personnel policies and lending practices during the
first six months—is unavailable and may never become a matter of public record. The
salient facts, however, are given in this chapter, based on Congressional testimony,
official reports, and discussions with participants in the HOLC's early organizational
activities.
2 Some decentralization was planned, but regional offices to direct loan servicing
were not established until 1934. The early plans called for a degree of centralization
that would probably have blocked achievement of the Corporation's objective; state
offices, for example, wererequired to get approval from the Washington office for each
loan.
14ORIGINAL LENDING ACTIVITIES 15
unemployment, aided the HOLC in obtaining qualified employees
quickly and easily. Operations were nationwide, so that many labor
markets could be drawn upon readily. An'other highly favorable per-
sonnel factor was a high state of morale among employees, who gen-
erally felt that the work was important and met a pressing social need.
General public sympathy and ready availability of office space, equip-
ment, and supplies (which could be purchased without the time-con-
suming routine of regular government procurement) were also favor-
able conditions. There were unfavorable features, however, due
mainly to the newness of the work, the uncertainty about the number
of cases and their complexity, the lack of precedent, the importance
of judgment as contrasted with routine in initial operations, the ab-
sence of any more than a nucleus of directly experienced personnel
(the FHLBB had only eighty-seven employees when the I-IOLC Act
was passed), and the necessity of working for some months under
conditions of unrelieved emergency.
Immediate efforts were made to acquaint the public with the new
agency, including a radio address by Senator James F. Byrnes, an-
other by Louis McHenry Howe, secretary to the President, and nu-
merous press statements. In August 1933, the Corporation issued a
small pamphlet describing its functions, the restrictions on its lend-
ing power and funds, its proposed appraisal standards, and the merits
of its bonds. The Corporation also issued a small pamphlet on loan
regulations, which explained the basis of valuation that would be
used (described in Chapter 3), and which should have helped remove
one possible source of misunderstanding, namely, that loans would
be limited to 80 percent of current depressed values. Even so, the
receipt of tens of thousands of applications ineligible on their face,
such as applications for loans on farms, business properties, and
buildings for more than four families, showed that public under-
standing was not clear.3 Large numbers of applicants were obviously
unable to understand the regulations, and aid in compliance was
necessary. The HOLC made some such assistance available to ap-
plicants through its local offices. In many communities where such
help was inadequate or unavailable private organizations provided
3 Mr. John H. Fahey, then Chairman of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, re-
marked on December '7, 1933, that one-third o[ the applications were ineligible despite
the publicity. See Dun's Review, Dun and Bradstreet, Vol. 41, No. 20G9 (December
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needed assistance.4 The initiative in making an application rested
nominally on the borrower, but lenders sometimes pressed borrowers
to file and helped in completing the application.
APPLICATIONS RECEIVED
Altogether, the HOLC received 1,886,491 applications for $6.2 bil-
lion of home mortgage refinancing (TableAll of these applica-
tions, however, did not necessarily meet HOLC requirements (for
example, as to value, distress, owner-occupancy, and the like), nor
had the lender involved necessarily agreed to HOLC refinancing. A
comparison of the number of applications with the over-all housing
data of the 1930 Census, scanty at best and somewhat out of date by
late 1933, reveals something of the extent to which the public sought
HOLC aid. On the assumption that the frequency of mortgage in-
debtedness was the same in 1930 as in 1940, it may be estimated that
45 percent of the country's 10.5 million nonfarm, owner-occupied
one- to four-family dwellings were mortgaged in 1930. Of this group
of 4.8 million potentially eligible cases, 40 percent applied for HOLC
aid.6 Of all the country's nonfarm owner-occupants, including, even
those having no mortgages and therefore not eligible for HOLC aid,
nearly one out of five applied for an HOLC loan.
Monthly data on applications received are not available for the
period before October 1933, when the rate of filing was obviously
high; even though few offices were able to accept applications before
mid-August, over 400,000—roughly, one-fifth of the entire total—
were filed by September 30, 1933 (Table 1).7 The rate declined dur-
4Asis customary in such legislation, the HOLC statute (June 18, 1983, C.64,48 Stat.
128 Sec. 8 (e) ) prohibited any charges for helping applicants fill out HOLC forms or for
giving them legal advice. Certain fees, such as charges for title search, were specifically
authorized and required, however, by the legislation.
5Anyformal request for refinancing filed on a form approved by the HOLC was
counted as an application. The figure excludes, however, hundreds of thousands of
inquiries, written and verbal, which received attention even though they did not lead
to a completed application.
6Someof the applications to the HOLC, and perhaps some of its loans, were on
properties which the census may have classified in the "farm" group; moreover, the
HOLC would lend on "homestead" properties not currently occupied by the owner.
Accordingly, the text comparisons may overstate the proportion of applications to
"potential eligibles" as the term is used here. On the other hand, not all of the 4.8
million owber-occupants, even if they had been in distress, could have met all HOLC
requirements, for example, size, value, or use of the property.
7Inaddition there were tens of thousands of letters of inquiryandapplications to
be handled. Although applications were to be sent to state and local offices, so many
came to Washington that a stenographic staff of over one hundred was needed to
handle the correspondence.ORIGINAL LENDING ACTIVITIES 17
TABLE 1 —APPLICATIONSRECEIVED BY THE HOLC, BY MONTH, JUNE 13,
1933-JuNE 27, 1935a
Year and Month ,
:





















January-April b .. ..
May C 2,914 92.5
Juned 140,726 100.0
Totale 1,884,356 100.0%
a Federal Home Loan Bank Review, Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Vol. 1, No. 11
(August 1985) p. 425; ibid., Vol. 2, No. 10 (July 1986) p. 381.
b Receipt of applications stopped November 13, 1934; resumed May 28, 1935.
e Represents applications received in three-day period from May 28 to May 31, 1935.
d Through June 27.
e Total does not agree with the total number of applications shown in Table 2 due
to the exclusion of data on applications received in Puerto Rico during 1934 and the
subsequent revision in the number received in some states—notably California, Colorado,
Illinois, and Washington. These reyisions are explained as follows: In some cases more
than one application was filed for a single property, chiefly when additional funds were
desired for taxes or repairs; the figures in Table 2, according to HOLC officials, have
been adjusted to treat all applications on a single property as one application rather
than as two or possibly more applications.18 HISTORY AND POLICIES OF THE HOLC
ing the rest of the year, rose in each of the first three months of 1934,
and then fell until the middle of November when the HOLC an-
nounced that it would accept no more applications. At that time the
monthly rate was well over 30,000, indicating a demand far from
trivial. During the thirty days ending June 27, 1935, applications
were again accepted, and 143,640 were filed.
The trend of filings in general confirms normal expectations—a
highearly rate followed by a substantial decline. Monthly totals fluc-
tuated, but there is very little objective evidence as to the reasons
for these variations. The rise in March and April 1934 may have
suited in part from the Administration's recommendation that the
principal as well as the interest of HOLC bonds be guaranteed. In
April 1934, Congress provided that the HOLC could refinance mort-
gages foreclosed as early as January 1, 1930 8(incontrast with a pro.
vision in the original law limiting cases to those foreclosed not over
two years before the refinancing). The figures do not indicate the
effects of this relaxation, but since the number of applications con-
tinued to fall, the effects were apparently not great. Another explana-
tion of the rise in March and April 1934 may be that lenders had
come to have more confidence in HOLC bonds.
The November 1934 announcement that no more applications
would be accepted was issued without warning. At time the
HOLC had nearly 1,100,000 applications on hand; it had loaned
two-thirds of its total authorization of $3 billion (the original $2
billion limit having been raised early in and had already ap-
proved the eligibility of enough applications to exhaust the balance
of its available funds. To accept more would have involved the ex-
pense of processing cases for which loans were unlikely and would
thereby have reduced the total amount of aid actually available. After
this date the HOLC concentrated on applications on which the pre-
liminary work had been done, attempting thereby to avoid useless
outlays. There is no evidence that the applications being filed at the
time were, on the average, more or less meritorious than those filed
earlier, but it is likely that after more than a year of operations the
most serious cases had already filed.
Shortly after it ceased accepting applications, the HOLC wrote
applicants and lenders, asking them to try to work out refinancing
8April27, 1934, c. 168, 48 Stat. 643, Sec. 4.
9June 27, 1934, c. 847, 48 Stat. 1246, Sec. 506 (a).ORIGINAL LENDING ACTIVITIES 19
arrangements between themselves. It also set up committees under
the federal home loan banks to try to bring applicants and institu-
tional lenders together; funds' for lending had become available in
many areas, and many of these loans were fundamentally good. In
New York it was announced that more than 5,000 of the best appli-
cations, involving $25 million, would be made available for purchase
by private financial institutions reported to have more than $32 mil-
lion in cash available for lending.1° On the last day of the year, how-
ever, President Roosevelt stated that, because private institutions
could not make enough loans, the lending authorization of the
HOLC should be increased, and an Administration bill to that effect
was introduced in Congress.
In the course of Senate hearings, Mr. Fahey asserted that the
bulk of distress applications had been received by the autumn of
1934, that renewed filing would induce persons not in real distress
to default in order to qualify for an HOLC loan and thus bring in
a large volume of cases which would require servicing even if they
had no merit. He maintained that private institutions could handle
current needs and were little inclined to foreclose, especially since the
real estate market had improved considerably. He felt that $1.5 bil-
lion was more than enough to handle the worthy applications on
hand, many of which were not eligible but might become eligible
with the passing of time." There were other statements made on
both, sides of the question,'2 and Congress finally increased the
HOLC's lending power by $1,750 million and provided that new
applications be accepted again for one month.'3
There is no evidence as to how widely information on the reopen-
ing of filing was disseminated, but less than 150,000 new applications
were received, amounting to $600 million. No special records were
kept of these cases, and so there is no way of knowing how many
10New YorkTimes, December 24, 1934, 28:1.
11U.S. Congress, Senate, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on
Banking and Currency on S. 1771 and H. R. 6021: Home Owners' Loan and National
Housing Act, 74th Congress, 1st Session (1935) pp. 143, 159-61.
12Somecriticism was made of the' "wholesale" program. ,as absorbing an undue
amount of the HOLC's lending capacity and thus curtailing the amount available for
cases in greater distress. One witness opposed reopening as likely to set a dangerous
precedent which might be repeated time after time. Senator Bulkley, a strong cham-
pion of the HOLC, argued that the sudden cutting off of applications was unfair be-
cause some persons with valid claims for help had not yet been able to complete all t.he
requirements for filing.
13May28, 1935, c. 150,49 Stat. 293, Sec. 11.20 HISTORY AND POLICIES OF THE HOLC
eventually received loans. By this time, however, the' HOLC was
screening applications carefully, even before accepting them for
filing. It is probable, therefore, that a very large fraction of the 150,-
000 cases had real merit and were not obviously ineligible. Some fell
in a special group—those made eligible for the first time by a provi-
sion permitting the HOLC to lend if any part of a property were used
by the owner as a dwelling (or homestead); '4 previously, the HOLC
had considered, a property ineligible if commercial use was more than
incidental. In the end, however, less than 6 percent of the additional
lending power was used.
The largest number of applications received from any single
state came from Ohio, and New York produced a larger dollar
amount of applications than any other state (Table 2). Three states
—Michigan, New York, and Ohio—accounted for nearly 30 percent
of the total number of applications and Illinois, New York, and Ohio
for almost one-third of the amount.15 A more significant measure of
the extent to which the HOLC refinancing facilities were utilized in
the various states can be derived, however, by expressing the number
of applications received from each state as a percentage of what may
be called the number of "potentially eligible" applicants, that is,
owner-occupants of one- to four-family, nonfarm, mortgaged dwell-
ings as estimated for 1930; one must ignore differences in proportions
of houses worth over $20,000, which cannot be separated in the tabu-
lations. In twenty-five states over half of the potentially eligible own-
ers applied for HOLC aid; in Arkansas and Mississippi the figure
exceeded nine out of ten; in Alabama, Arizona, and the Dakotas more
than three out of every four nonfarm owner-occupants holding mort-
gages applied for aid (Table 2); these high figures are accounted for
partially, though probably to a small extent, by the fact that in these
states there were few houses appraised at over $20,000. The ,District
of Columbia was lowest with 15 percent, and New Hampshire was
the only state in which less than one-fifth of the potentially eligible
owners applied. Finally, there were only five states in which fewer
14 Ibid., Sec. 10.
15 The large number of applications from Indiana, Michigan, and Ohio are due in
part to blocks of "wholesale" cases which will be described later in this chapter. More
fundamental reasons could doubtless be found, however, such as unusually liberal
savings and loan association lending during the twenties in Ohio and the collapse of
the Detroit real estate market. An exceptionally large number of clearly ineligible
applications were accepted by some Illinois offices, swelling that state's total.ORIGINAL LENDING ACTIVITIES 21














Maine 7,781 $20 $2,518 31%
New Hampshire 3,677 9. 2,563 18
Vermont 2,568 7 2,692 20
Massachusetts 50,419 229 4,545 20
Rhode Island 12,338 52 4,192 33
Connecticut 22,327 118 5,293 21
Middle Atlantic
NewYork 157,872 810 5,129 25
NewJersey 81,920 424 5,171 33
Pennsylvania 121,483 450 3,706 28
eastNorth Central
Ohio 193,502 704 3,639 53
Indiana 82,023 203 2,480 51
Illinois 127,128 502 3,951 38
Michigan 145,539 409 2,810 55
Wisconsin 55,744 218 3,913 44
West North Central
Minnesota 36,251 90 2,494 39
Iowa 31,805 65 2,037 41
Missouri 45,666 145 3,177 34
North Dakota 7,458 15 2,061 76
South Dakota 9,296 17 1,809 81
Nebraska 19,985 43 2,137 49
Kansas 31,447 56 1,783 53
South Atlantic
Delaware 2,815 9 3,330 23
Maryland 28,854 87 3,011 38
Dist. of Columbia 4,428 28 6,221 15
Virginia 21,154 64 3,011 38
West Virginia 18,592 48 2,592 56
North Carolina 24,303 62 2,541 48
South Carolina 9,997 23 2,326 50
Georgia 23,343 53 2,263 56
Florida .24,891 56 2,247 61
East South Central
Kentucky 20,460 54 2,630 38
Tennessee 24,405 54 2,231 53
Alabama 28,010 62 2,221 79
Mississippi 18,600 31 1,680 99
(concluded on next page)22 HISTORY AND POLICIES OF THE HOLC
TABLE 2 —(concluded)
Number asa
Census Region Amount AveragePercentage
and State (000,000) Amountof Total
Eligibles b
J'Vest South Central
Arkansas 19,768 $32 $1,612 92%
Louisiana 24,747 71 2,853 69
Oklahoma
S 38,369 86 2,250 70
Texas 76,537. 177 2,313 61
Mountain
Montana 7,017 13 1,886 68
Idaho 6,752 11 1,584 64
Wyoming 3,793 8 2,078 63
Colorado 19,726 43 2,161 52
NewMexico 4,778. 10 2,034 70
Arizona 9,458 26 2,702 81
Utah 14,879 35 2,370 70
Nevada 1,704 5 2,786 70
Pacific
Washington 39,539 77 1,937 48
Oregon 16,863 37 2,204 36
California 102,392 315 3,078 32
United States C 1,886,491 $6,173 $3,272 40%
a FifthAnnual Report, Federal Home Loan Bank Board (June 30, 1937) Exhibit
19, pp. 159.60. The provision of Public Law No. 76, 74th Congress (May 28, 1935, c. 150,
49 Stat. 293, Sec. 11) set the terminal date for receipt of application at June 27, 1935.
b Only mortgaged, nonfarm, owner-occupied dwellings were potentially eligible for
an HOLC Joan. The number of these dwellings was estimated for 1930 by assuming for
each state that the percentage of nonfarm, owner-occupied dwellings that were mort-
gaged in 1930 was the same as that reported in the 1940 Census. The method of estimate
undoubtedly produces some error. It seems improbable, for instance, that the true fig-
nrc in Mississippi was 99 percent. Unfortunately, no basis for narrowing the possible
range of en-or has been found.
cIncludesAlaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico.
than one out of four applied; New York's °rate—25 percent—was sub-
stantially below the national average of 40 percent.'6
State variations were presumably due in part to differences in
16 For the country as a whole, nearly 18 percent of all nonfarm owner-occupants,
whether their homes were mortgaged or not, applied for HOLC aid. The states with the
highest rates were Utah, Arizona, Mississippi, Michigan, and Alabama—29,3, 28.6, 28.6,
26.8, and 26.6 percent, respectively. In eight states one-fourth or more of the owner-
occupants soughi HOLC aid, and only in Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, the Dis-
trict of Columbia, and Puerto Rico was the rate less than 10 pet-cent. The data on
owner-occupancy are from the 1930 Census.ORIGINAL LENDING ACTIVITIES 23
need, but other factors—the condition of lending institutions and
their prior lending policies and state HOLC policy—were also sig-
nificant. With respect to the last, state offices varied widely in their
preliminary screening of applications, especially in the eari.y months
when filings were heavy. For short periods, at least, standards di-
verged widely. Even though the same general rules applied through-
out the country, interpretations naturally varied, and with all states
reporting to Washington directly, effective supervision was difficult
and uniformity obtained only slowly. Some states, for example, ap-
parently placed little emphasis on a requirement enforced by others
—that the applicant try to refinance through the private financial
system before coming to the HOLC.
The average amount applied for over the country as a whole was
$3,272 (Table 2).17. Here again, state variations were wide. The high-
est was $6,221 in the District of Columbia; the lowest, $1,584 in
Idaho. In Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York the average was
around $5,000, while in Massachusetts it was about $4,500. Amounts
applied for in the South and in the Missouri Valley and Plains areas
were below average.
APPLICATIONS REJECTED
A total of 868,670 applications, 46 percent of all those filed, were
either rejected by 'the HOLC or withd.rawn before final HOLC ac-
tion. Little has been published, however,on the reasons for rejection
or withdrawal. On the basis of the first six months' experience, Mr.
Fahey stated to Congress that 30 percent of all applications were in-
eligible and a year later said that in its early days the HOLC accepted
many applications which it should never have taken.'8 As time passed,
the preliminary screening improved, so that more of the obviously
ineligible cases never reached the formal application stage. Yet the
-definitionof ineligibility was not clear; some properties may have
17 The figures on applied for are by no means unambiguous. In some cases
they represent the full amount due on the house, including taxes and back interest;
in others they represent the reduced amounts for which the lenders had agreed to com-
promise. Typically, tax and interest accruals during the processing of the application
added to the total due by the time the loan was made, and sometimes application was
made for funds to meet other than mortgage debt. Very often the applicant did not
know precisely how much he owed when he filed the application.
18 For a time, the standards in parts of certain states were depressed by policies of
local officials that verged upon the corrupt. One official was discharged just as he was
about to complete a large group of loans without any appraisal.24 HISTORY AND POLICIES OF THE HOLC
been so classed because they were farm properties, housed too many
families, were nonhomestead rental properties,19 or fellclearlybeyond
the limits set by Congress; others may have been classed as ineligible
by the HOLC itself, for example, owing to valuation or lack of
distress. While it would be of interest to know something of the rea-
sons for limitations on HOLC aid, it is not now possible to separate
these two groups of cases.
The data in Table 3 are from an unpublished HOLC study coy-
eririg 577,642 cases—two-thirds of the eventual total—and cover a'll
rejections to May 16, 1935. The large category in Table 3—"applica-
TABLE 3 —WITHDRAWALSAND REJECTIONS TO MAY 16, 1935, OF APPLI-
CATIONS RECEIVED, BY REASON FOR REJECTION a
.
Reasonfor Rejection Number Percen tag
of Total
e
Applications Rejected 487,548 81.4%
Inadequatesecurityb
•103,145 17.9
Lack of distress 72,778 12.6
Failure of applicant to cooperate 56,186 9.7
Property of nonhomestead type 46,353 8.0
Mortgagee's refusal to accept bonds 44,446 7.7
Unstable credit or income of mortgagor 43,249 7.5
Property primarily for commercial use





lications With drawn 90,094 15.6
Total 577,642 100.0% .
a Data made available by the HOLC.
b Includes cases classified by the HOLC under "insufficient appraisal."
tions withdrawn"—undoubtedly includes many cases in which the
reason for withdrawal was one of those also listed in the table as a rea-
son for rejection.2° The withdrawn cases include another important
type—those where the borrower andthe lender (or lenders) were able
to agree on terms, rendering HOLC refinancing unnecessary, a condi-
tion encouraged by the HOLC. Some part of the I-IOLC accomplish-
ment, therefore, lay in the help it gave to distressed borrowers in
19Thedefinition of "homestead" varied according to different state offices.
20 Some applications were withdrawn for transfer to the Farm Credit Administra-
tion, the federal agency set up to grain help on farm properties.ORIGINAL ACflVITIES 25
working out agreements with their creditors or in finding other
lenders.
The most important reason for rejection was "inadequate se-
curity," even .though the HOLC's system of appraisal, discussed in
Chapter 3, was generous by prevailing market standards. In general,
loans could be made up to 80 percent of the HOLC appraisal, and
in most areas appraisals were sufficiently generous to permit loans
nearly as large—possibly larger—than current market price. Where
the security was inadequate, or where the appraisal was "insufficient,"
therefore, the owner probably had very little, if any, equity. Thou:
sands of HOLC loans were made whei'e the appraisal was too low to
permit. the refinancing of all the debt against the property, in which
case the original lender sacrificed part of his claim. The willingness
of lenders to compromise, therefore, had much to do with determin-
ing whether an application would be withdrawn on grounds of "in-
adequate security." One other very different type of case is included
in this category, namely, the occasional case in which the information
on the appraisal form was inadequate and, for some reason never
completed.
There is little to say about the other categories of rejections. Pre-
sumably, "failure of applicant to cooperate" often indicated lack of,
distress, although at times it may have resulted from a knowledge
that the application was not eligible or that other arrangements
could be made. In other cases there may have been no great desire on
the part of the applicant to refinance his debt; indeed, the charge
was sometimes made that borrowers let negotiations drag on, even
when they had no intention of refinancing, with the object of getting
a few more months of costless housing.
ACCEPTABILITY OF BONDS BY MORTGAGEES
The success of the,entire HOLC plan depended upon the willing-
ness of l,enders to accept HOLC bonds in exchange for' their out-
standing mortgages, yet it was by no means certain that the bonds
would be generally accepted. The chief uncertainties arose from
(1) the limitation of the government guarantee to interest only, with
no commitment on principal, and the belief that the HOLC, as a
type of relief agency, would lose money; (2) the relatively low in-
terest rate of 4 percent, which was, roughly, a third below the cus-
tomary. rate on mortgages; (3) the legal restrictions on investment26 ANt> IOLICIES OF THE I-IOLC
policies of some financial institutions; and (4) the lack of confidence
in the government's credit.2' On the other hand were the facts that
(1) the government guarantee of interest was much better than the
promise of the home owner, since the latter, by definition, was in
financial difficulty and a cash return of 4 percent was more attractive
than an accruing but uncollectible 6 percent; (2) the acceptance of
bonds meant the avoidance of money costs, trouble, and the loss of
goodwill resulting from foreclosure; (3) the Corporation's appraisal
standards might permit the receipt of more in bonds than could be
obtained from sale at foreclosure (although this condition could not
have been fully appreciated until after the HOLC operations had
started); (4) exchange of the mortgage loan for HOLC bonds would
free the lender of collection and servicing costs, which on loans of the
quality under consideration must have been substantial in relation
to their yield; and (5) the bonds were exempt from state and local
property taxes, and the income was exempt from state income tax
-andfrom the federal normal income tax. In addition, laws limiting
the investments which financial institutions might acquire could be,
and were, changed.
President Roosevelt, in originally advocating the plan, specifi-
cally stated, giving no definite reasons, that the government should
guarantee interest only. Representative Steagall, who had charge of
the bill for the Administration in the House, probably expressed the
President's position in stating that, since there was a limit to the ob-
ligations the Treasury could assume, the guarantee should be re-
stricted to interest.22 Doubts about the adequacy of the guarantee of
interest only were expressed during the initial House debate; how-
ever, Administration forces defeated attempts to extend the guaran-
tee to principal without clearly, meeting the objections.23 In the
Senate Hearings the lack of guarantee of principal was listed by one
21 Other features of the bonds, such as callability, do not seem to have been cited
as undesirable. Actually, the cailability was to prove very costly to persons who
changed mortgages for bonds, because shortly alter agreeing to a settlement in which
they were promised, and received, bonds yielding 4 percent, they were compelled to give
up the bonds, being offered in exchange bonds with much lower yields. Had the original
bonds not been callable, the former lenders might have enjoyed the 4 percent yield
for almost eighteen years in some cases and for more than sixteen years in most cases. The
ot:iginal 4 percent bonds were dated July 1, 1933, and matured July 1, 1951; the ma-
turity was thus roughly eighteen years from the first loan and fifteen from the last.
22 Congressional Record, Vol. 77, Part 3, 73rd Congress, 1st Session (1933) p. 2478.
23 Ibid., pp. 2488, 2500-07, and 2577.ORIGINAL LENDING ACTIVITIES 27
witness as the first of fourteen faults.24 There was no real discussion
of the issues on the floor of the Senate.
Before lending operations started, the AdministratiOn and groups
sympathetic to the program took steps to enhance the acceptability
of the, bonds. The New York Real Estate Securities 'Exchange an-
nounced that they would be admitted for trading; President Roose-
velt urged savings banks to accept them; 25 the Treasury made the
bonds acceptable as collateral for deposits of public money; the Re-
construction Finance Corporation agreed to accept them as collateral
'up to 80 percent of face value; 26 in August the HOLC in one of its
press releases ongeneral problem pointed out that the
bonds could be used at face value to repay debts to the Corpora-
tion; 27 several large financial institutions pledged themselves to
accept the bonds.28 Finally, in late September, the Comptroller of the
Currency reversed an earlier stand to permit receivers of national
banks to accept them.29 Effective steps were taken to have state laws
revised where necessary to permit financial institutions to accept the
bonds, and in 1933 the HOLC authorized a group of prominent
banking institutions to form a nationwide organization to distribute
them.8°
24 U. S. Congress, Senate, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on
Banking and Currency on S. 1317: HomeOwners' LoanAct, 73rd Congress, 1st Session
(1933) p. 37.
25 New York Times, August 8, 1933, 27:1.
26 Ibid., August 2, 1933, 30:5. To allow over 80 percent would be virtually to redeem
debt which the government did not want redeemed. The Postal Savings System author-
ized acceptance of the bonds at market value as security for postal savings deposits.
New York Times, August 27, 1933, Sec. 11, 1:3.
27 This privilege could obviously help materially in maintaining the value of the
bonds. Since they were to be issued in denominations as low as $25, their use in pay-
ment of amounts due. the HOLC was not barred by the lack of availability of conven-
ient units. This use of bonds differed from that referred to in footnote 26 above. Use of
bonds as security for an RFC loan gave a claim on the government for cash, whereas
use to repay the HOLC in effect produced a claim for a mortgage (or part of one).
28 New York Times, August 8, 1933, 27:1; August 9, 1933, 27:2.
29 Ibid., September 26, 1933, 31:6.
30 New York State passed permissive legislation in August, and in a September ac-
tion allowed receivers to accept HOLC bonds; and Ohio, Pennsylvania, and other
states followed (New York Times, August 27, 1933, Sec. 1, 8:2; Sec. 11, 1:3 and Sep-
tember 3, 1933, Sec. 2, 5:2); Pennsylvania ruled that insurance companies might acquire
bonds in exchange for mortgages but would not be permitted to buy them, and New
Jersey did not pass its permissive law until late September, thereby slowing HOLC
operations in that state (New York Times, September 17, 1933, Sec. 2, 10:2; September
18, 1933, 17:1; and September 29, 1933, 35:1). In a nationwide radio address, Mr. Fahey
late in November explained the investment merits of HOLC bonds. His talk is repro-
duced in Dun's Review, Dun and Bradstreet, Vol. 41, No. 2069 (December 1933) pp. 2-5.28 HISTORY AND POLICIES OF THE HOLC
"When issued" trading began on the New York Real Estate Se-
curities Exchange on Augqst 29 with a sale at 85, but stopped a few
days later at the HOLC's request until a prospectus was available
to aid investors in judging values, resuming at The bid fell later
and then rose; early autumn sales were largely on the "short" side.
The HOLC began at once to repurchase bonds (technically, at the
time, interim receipts) offered at large discounts. It found sellers un-
'able to make delivery for several weeks, however, because very few
loans had been completed, and virtually no receipts had yet been is-
sued. The HOLC's action helped raise prices of the bonds, so that
by the year's end they were selling near par. Through the early lend-
ing months, HOLC bonds were quoted at a discount—around 90 to
95—that must have reduced the willingness of lenders to ex-
change mortgages for the bonds and slowed negotiations between
borrower and lender.32 To this extent HOLC operations were re-
tarded, but, even so, the corporation was probably processing cases
as rapidly as possible.
In the first Congressional session after the HOLC started lending,
at least twenty-four bills were introduced providing for guarantee of
In January 1934, President Roosevelt recommended
guaranteeing the principal of the farm refinancing bonds (which
promptly rose over five points) and on March 1, 1934 he sent a mes-
sage to Congress urging a similar guarantee of HOLC bonds.34 It was
pointed out in House Hearings that a guarantee of interest was tanta-
mount to a guarantee of principal, but that an explicit guarantee of
principal would help materially in closing loans, and would enable
the Corporation to borrow more cheaply.35 Mr. Fahey pointed out
31 New York Times, August 30, 1933, 27:5; September 12, 1933, 33:1; and September
13, 1933, 30:1.
32 Ibid., January 28, 1934, Sec. 10, 2:2; February 3, 1934, 12:6; and February 18, 1934,
Sec. 10, 1:3.
33 Congressional Record, Vol. 78, Part 12, Index, 73rd Congress, 2nd Session (1934)
p. 215. Mr. Fahey told the author that by late 1933 it was generally believed that the
principal would soon be guaranteed.
34 New York Times, March 2, l934, 29:8.
35 Testimony of Mr. Horace Russell, appearing for the HOLC before the House
Banking and Currency Committee. (U. S. Congress, House, Hearings before the Com-
mittee on Banking and Currency on H.R. 8403 [S. 2999]: To Guarantee Bonds of the
Home Owners' Loan Corporation, 73rd Congress, 2nd Session [1934] p. 32.) These hear-
ings disclosed that some in Michigan were cited—had required borrowers
to give additional notes or cash for the difference between the par value of HOLC bonds
and the prevailing discount. Mr. Fahey and Mr. Russell said that the Corporation was
trying vigorously to prevent this and had taken the position that such notes were with.
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that the Corporation would soon be taking in funds that it would
use for retirement and that as permitted in the proposed Act, new,
guaranteed bonds would be exchanged for the old ones.3° The bill
also authorized open market purchases; the tax exemption privileges
the bonds were justified as necessary to make them equivalent to
Others issued by the government.37
Shortly after passage of the bill, which undoubtedly enhanced
the acceptability of its bonds, the HOLC announced new eighteen-
year bonds, callable in ten years and bearing a 3 percent coupon.38
The Corporation also benefited from improving government credit
and falling interest rates through the next decade. During this pe-
riod, there were times, as in 1938, when the chances of HOLC liqui'-
dation without loss were seriously lessened and at such times the
guarantee of principal must have aided its credit. In view of the ces-
sation of new lending, however, there was then no longer any ques-
tion of getting bonds exchanged for mortgages.
VOLUME OF ORIGINAL LENDING ACTIVITIES
REFINANCING LOANS
The HOLC made over one million refinancing loans for a total of
$3.1 billion (Table 4).39 Naturally, applications were received far
more rapidly in the early months than loans could be completed; by
the end of 1933, roughly 723,000 applications had been received, but
36 Ibid.,. pp. 80-81. There was some dissatisfaction with the proposal to exchange
new bonds at par for old ones that present holders had purchased at a discount in the
open market. Mr. Fahey said that there was no practical way the Corporation could
check to prevent the proposed exchange in such cases and thus to eliminate profits to
speculators. He pointed out, however, that very few bonds had been transferred for
less than 85 percent of par (the figure cited in the Hearings) and that not more than
$6 million had yet got into the market at all. Ibid., pp. 42-43, 64.
A suggestion of the later struggle over the interest rate charged on HOLC loans
appeared when one Representative argued that since the guarantee of principal would
reducethe cost of borrowing, the saving should he passed on to the debtors, for whose
aid the HOLC had been established. Ibid., p. 76.
37 Ibid., p. 80.
38 New York Times, April 29, 1934, Sec. 2, 9:7. Mr. Fahey told the author that
since the 1-IOLC would begin early to receive funds for retirement of bonds from the
amortization payments by borrowers, he believed and urged atthe time that heavy re-
liance could and should be placed on shorter-term, lower-rate issues. The Treasury,
however, preferred to have the HOLC depend primarily on long-term issues.
39 In addition, it made 8,590 supplemental reconditioning ipans on the same prop.
erties during the original lending period and additional subsequent advances for re-
conditioning, taxes, interest, and insurance. Also, 184,475 loans were (through
March 31, 1951) to purchasers of houses acquired by the HOLC through foreclosure on
earlier mortgages.30 HISTORY AND POLICIES OF THE HOLC
TABLE 4 —LOANSCLOSED BY THE HOLC, BY MONTH, AUGUST 20, 1933-
JUNE 12, 1936 a





A n'z OUfl t
1933
August-September 1,397 $4 .1% .1% $2,943
October 5,732 19 .7 .8 3,394
November 16,639 45 2.4 2.2 2,686
December 27,004 73 5.0 4.6 2,716
1934
January 35,781 97 8.5 7.7 2,706
February 43,009 122 12.7 11.6 2,824
March 51,492 157 .17.8 16.7 3,047
April 59,594 180 23.6 22.5 3,017
May 71,487 221 30.7 29.7 3,092
June 82,386 251 38.8 37.8 3,045
July 78,765 236 46.5 45.4 2,996
August 70,092 218 53.4 52.5 3,115
September 63,300 191 59.6 58.6 3,016
October 65,777 203 66.1 65.2 3,089
November 58,534 185 71.8 71.2 3,159
December 59,091 180 77.6 77.0 3,044
1935
January 44,987 136 82.0 81.4 3,029
February 16,325 48 83.6 82.9 2,932
March 9,621 30 84.6 83.9 3,116
April 8,576 25 85.4 84.7 2,968
May 13,212 41 .86.7 86.1 3,121
June 11,383 36 87.9 87.2 3,160
July 11,812 36 89.1 88.4 3,043
August 14,030 44 90.4 89.8 3,105
September 14,212 45 91.8 91.3 3,147
October 17,020 55 93.5 93.0 3,209
November 16,328 51 95.1 94.7 3,127
December 14,785 48 '96.5 96.2 3,259
1936
January 10,703 35 97.6 97.4 3,307
February ' 8,132 28 98.4 98.3 3,437
March 5,619 19 98.9 98.9 3,441
April 5,679 19 99.5 99.5 3,413
May-June 5,317 15 100.0 100.0 2,781
Total 1,017,821 $3,093 , 100.0%100.0% $3,039
a Data' made available by the HOLC. The figures represent revised estimates and
therefore differ from earlier compilations in which the method of classifying supple-
mental loans on a single property was not uniform in all cases.ORIGINAL LENDING ACTIVITIES 31
only 51,000 loans had been made (Table 4). And it took a year for
the number of loans closed per month to equal the number of new
applications received. Still, in this first year of operation nearly 395,-
000 loans, totaling $1.2 billion, were completed. One should not
conclude, however, that the timing of the major initial economic ef-
fects was necessarily the same as the timing of the loan closing; of it-
self, the expectation that loans would be made probably produced
some important economic results, such as reduction of foreclosures
and forced liquidation, months before the loans were closed. Other
effects, such as those resulting from the availability of cash to state
and local governments for tax arrears and more liquid assets to for-
mer debtors, however, could seldom have appeared before the loan
was disbursed. By June 30, 1935, about 87 percent of both the num-
ber and the total dollar amount of loans had been completed, but
lending continued for another year. The average size of loan made
varied from month to month, but, except for a few months at the be-
ginning and close of the lending period, it seldom varied more than
5 percent from the average, which was about $3,000 (Table 4).
The number of loans completed was 54 percent of the number
of applications, and the amount almost exactly half of the dollar total
requested. In ten states, generally in New England and on the At-
lantic seaboard but also including California, Kentucky, and Missis-
sippi, more than half of the applications were rejected or withdrawn.
In eleven widely scattered states more than six out of ten applicants
received a loan. The highest ratios of loans to applications were in
Nevada and Utah, the lowest (except for the territories) in Maine
and New Jersey (Table 5).40
Nearly one out of every ten nonfarm, owner-occupied dwellings
in the country became mortgaged to the HOLC, and the Corporation
made loans on more than one out of every five such dwellings with
a mortgage, that is, to the potentially eligible cases. In ArizQna, Ne-
vada, South Dakota, and Utah more than half. of the potentially eligi-
ble cases received loans, whereas in Connecticut, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, and the District of Columbia the rate was one out of ten
or less (Table 5).
40Atleast part of the explanation of the results in these two states, according to
Mr. Fahey, is that initial organizations were relatively poor and applied rather low
standards in screening applications. In general, however, there seems to be little basis
for explaining specific differences in state ratios of loans to applications.HISTORY AND POLICIES OF THE HOLC
TABLE 5 —LOANSCLOSED BY THE HOLC, BY STATE, AUGUST 20, 1933-
















Maine 3,398 $8$2,276 13%44% 65.2%
New Hampshire 1,867 5 2,417 9 51 64.0
Vermont 1,576 4 2,664 12 61 68.5
Massachusetts 24,524 109 4,448 9 49 73.7
Rhode Island 6,118 25 4,037 16 50 68.0
Connecticut 10,281 44 4,303 10 46 73.7
Middle Atlantic
New York 80,115 411 5,134 13 51 72.0
New Jersey 36,339 175 4,825 15 44 67.1
Pennsylvania 58,793 167 2,841 14 48 68.9
East North Central
Ohio 98,556 306 3,104 27 51 67.3
Indiana 48,815 112 2,298 30 59 66.6
Illinois 69,985 279 3,993 21 55 70.7
Michigan 81,126 240 2,959 31 56 65.2
Wisconsin 33,101 115 3,486 26 59 67;6
West North Central
Minnesota 21,021 48 2,282 23 58 67.6
Iowa' 19,633 39 1,978 26 62 62.9
Missouri 24,535 75 3,052 18 54 69.9
North Dakota 4,416 9 2,047 45 59 60.6
SouthDakota 6,122 11 1,780 53 66 62.8
Nebraska 13,597 28 2,068 33 68 67.5
Kansas 18,504 34 1,818 31 59 63.2
South Atlantic
Delaware 1,642 5 3,109 14 58 '72.9
Maryland 15,928 .46 2,863 21 55 . 68.1
Dist. of Columbia2,087 12 5,819 7 47' 75.1
Virginia 12,031 38 3,133 21 .57 70.3
West Virginia 9,079 23 2,519 27 49 63.8
North Carolina12,319 3.1 '2,548 24 51 65.0
South Carolina 5,683 13 2,340 29 57 69.3
Georgia 14,850 34 2,267 36 64 71.3
Florida 13,524 31 2,268 33 54 68.8
East South Central
Kentucky 9,234 25 2,743 17 45 66.9
Tennessee 13,761 31 2,255 30 56 70.3
Alabama 16,611 37 2,230 47 59 67.6
Mississippi 8,762 16 1,879 47 47 62.1


















West South Central . '
Arkansas 10,344 $19$1,806 48%52% 68.9%
'Louisiana 14,379 40 2,799 40 58 69.4
Oklahoma 23,960 54 2,270 44 62 67.7
Texas 44,355 103 2,327 . 35 58 66.0
Mountain
Montana 3,679 7 1,980 36 52 62.6
Idaho 4,692 8 1,744 44 69 64.5
Wyoming 2,446 5 2,234 41 64 65.5
Colorado 11,613 23 1,974 30 59 70.8
New Mexico 2,462 5 2,086 . 36 52 65.4
Arizona 6,508 16 2,423 56 69 67.0
Utah 10,749 25 2,329 51 72 68.7
Nevada 1,211 3 2,724 50 71 56.8
Pacific .
Washington 21,438 39 1,814 26 54 68.6
Oregon 9,416 19 1,971 20' 56 69.0
California 51,554 138 2,652 16 50 72.7
United Statesd 1,017,821 $3,093$3,039 21%54% 68.6%
a Dataon number and amount of loans closed are from tabulations made by the
HOLC in February 1944; data on loan amount in percent of HOLC appraisal are from
the Third Annual Report, Federal Home Loan Bank Board (June 30, 1935) Exhibit 9.
bOnlymortgaged, nonfarm, owner-occupied dwellings were potentially eligible
for an HOLC loan. The number ofthese dwellings were estimated for 1930 by assuming
for each state that the percentage of nonfarm, owner-occupied dwellings which were
mortgaged in 1930 was the same as that reported in the 1940 Census.
Original loan amount as a percentage of final HOLC review appraisal of the
property.
d Includes Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico.
More loans were made in Ohio than in any other state; Michigan
was second and New York, third (Table 5). The largest dollar amount
was recorded in New York, nearly one-eighth of the national total;
Ohio was second. Nevada was lowest in both number of loan's and
dollar amount. The average loan for the country as a whole was
$3,039 (Table 5). The highest state average—$5,l34 in New York
(the District of Columbia average was $5,8 19)—was about three times
the lowest—$1,744 in Idaho. The average amount of the rejected or
withdrawn applications in the United States was about 15 percent34 HISTORY AND POLICIES OF THE HOLC
more than the average loan closed. Differences .in this respect were
striking: in Pennsylvania, for example, the average application re-
jected or withdrawn was 60 percent larger in amount than the av-
erage loan closed, whereas in Idaho the average loan was 40 percent
more than the average withdrawal or rejection.
Nearly 40 percent of all loans were for less than $2,000, and 75
percent were for less than $4,000; only 1.4 percent were for $10,000
or more (Table 6).
• TABLE 6 —LOANSCLOSED BY THE HOLC, BY ORIGINAL LOAN AMOUNT,
AUGUST 20, 1933-JUNE 12, 1936 a
Original
. Amount Number Percentage
of Total
.
Under $1,000 128,228 12.6%
1,000—1,999 255,670 25.1
2,000—2,999 227,964 22.4





a Data made available by the HOLC.
Another characteristic of the. loans deserving special mention is
the amount of the mortgage in relation to the value of the collateral
as indicated by the HOLC's appraisal. For the country as a whole
this figure was 68.6 percent, notably less than the 80 percent permit-
ted by law (Table 5).41Theaverage District of Columbia ratio was
75.1 percent, while in Connecticut and Massachusetts it was 73.7; in
New York, where the most money was lent, the rate was 72.0 per-
cent, and in Ohio, where the most loans were made, it 67.3 per-
cent. The Nevada rate was lowest—56.8 percent—and North Dakota
was next with 60.6 percent. It seems clear, therefore, that for the mil-
lion HOLC loans as a group the amount of aid advanced was not
effectively restricted by the appraisal put on the property and that
the HOLC, on the basis of its own valuations, obtained more cov-
erage on its loans than required by statute. In thousands of individ-
ual cases, however, conditions were different, and successful refi-
41Therewere not enough, cash loans, on which the permissive loan-to-value ratio
was only 40 or 50 percent, to affect the total appreciably.ORIGINAL LENDING•ACTIVITIES 35
nancing required some scaling down of debts, as described in the
next section.
just under 90 percent of the original loans—$2.72 billion out of
nearly $3.1 billion—went to former mortgagees; $233 million went
to governments in payment of taxes, assessments, and other amounts
due; nearly $81 million was used for repair and reconditioning of the
mortgaged properties and $58 million for insurance, appraisal, legal
fees, and other costs. Slightly over one-fifth of the amounts paid to
original lenders went to individuals and ñoninstitutional lenders,
and the balance to institutions ($768 million to building and loan
associations, cooperative banks and similar institutions and $746
million to commercial banks).42
HANDLING OF SECOND MORTGAGES AND
OTHER JUNIOR CLAIMS
In the twenties, second mortgages and other junior obligations were
commonly used in home financing; many survived to the depression
period and were outstanding when the HOLC began giving help.
If the HOLC were to succeed in providing relief where such claims
existed, some method of reconciling various interests had to be de-
vised. In. general, of course, no serious difficulties arose when all
claimants could be satisfied in full with a total loan of not more than
80 percent of the HOLC appraisal.48 In other cases, however, spe-
cial action was required, and an Adjustment Section was established
in each HOLC loan processing office to handle such problems.
Each case received special attention, and any of a variety of solutions
might be reached.
Sometimes part or all of the claims that could not be satisfied with
an 80 percent loan were covered by new junior debt. The total of the
HOLC loan and any such junior lien, however, was not to exceed
the HOLC appraisal. The HOLC policy of limiting total obliga-
tions on a property to 100 percent of its appraisal was established
early and though not, specifically provided for by statute was felt to
be consistent with, and even necessary for, successful carrying Out
of Congress' wishes. The purpose was to restrict total obligations to
42 Sixth Annual Report, Federal Home Loan Bank Board (June 30, 1938) p. 70;
Fifth Annual Report, Federal Home Loan Bank Board (June 30, 1937) p. 29.
43 Exceptions sometimes arose when' the HOLC felt that an 80 percent loan was more
than the applicant could successfully carry.36 HISTORY AND POLICIES OF THE HOLC
an amount which the borrower could reasonably hope to carry suc-
cessfully. Moreover, the existence of large junior claims could lead
to situations in which the borrower, though having gradually repaid
much of his first mortgage debt to the HOLC, would eventually lose
the house to the holder of the junior obligation. In effect, the holder
of a junior debt might wait while the first mortgage was being paid
off and then obtain the property or the full satisfaction of his claim,
the payments of the owner meanwhile having accrued to the benefit
of the holder of the junior lien. The HOLC believed that its mission
of providing relief for home owners would thereby be frustrated.
If the total loan were limited to the appraised value of the property,
assuming the latter to be accurate (or below market price), the owner
could reasonably expect to salvage his savings by sale of the property
to satisfy all claims. The HOLC, however, did not automatically ap-
prove junior liens even witfiin the 100 percent limit. If the owner's
inability to carry and repay such debt was apparent, the HOLC
would not participate in refinancing involving the junior debt.
Where such debt was authorized, the HOLC imposed conditions
such as the following: (1) the junior lien would have to be secured
by a bond and mortgage, necessitating foreclosure as a means of
liquidation; (2) the consent of the HOLC would have to be obtained
before the second lienholder would be permitted to foreclose; (3)
the junior lien could not be foreclosed until after the HOLC de-
clared its mortgage in default; (4) principal payments would not be
demanded for periods of three, five,, seven or ten years, depending
upon the individual circumstances.
In closing an HOLC refinancing agreement, all lienholders were
required to sign releases for amounts not refinanced. Sometimes,
however, lienholders and home owners made private agreements for
financing excesses not covered in the negotiations authorized by the
HOLC. The courts have held in all such cases litigated that agree-
ments of this type are void as being against public policy. No such
claims, even though covered by a mortgage, have been enforced by
a court.44
44Thisgeneralization is based on a statement supplied by the HOLC and confirmed
by the opinion of the New York Supreme Court, Kings County, in Amos v. Amos, re-
ported in the NewYorkLaw Journal, June 27, 1950, Vol. 123, No. 123, p. 2263; this
opinion cites decisions of other New York courts and the courts of six other states (Penn-
sylvania, Michigan, Ohio, California, Illinois, Oklahoma), all of which reached a similar
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Compromises of many kinds were reached. The holder of a sec-
ond mortgage was not without bargaining power inasmuch as his
failure to agree could prevent a settlement, but as a rule he probably.
stood to gain little or nothing by preventing HQLC help and thus.
forcing action through the normal legal channels. Among the types
of arrangements made were those in which the holders of the prior
lien would purchase junior claims on various terms so that HOLC
refinancing would be concluded. Although great ingenuity was em-
ployed by the HOLC Adjustment Sections, many problems remained,
unsolved, and the failure of lienholders to compromise prevented
refinancing which the HOLC was willing to conclude .and which it
felt would have been desirable, especially for the home owner.
No data are available on the claims which former lenders sacri-
ficed.
WHOLESALE OPERATIONS
A special problem was presented by the mortgages held by the hun-
dreds of banks andother financial institutions being liquidated in
1933-34 or near to being closed. Although the policies of receivers,
liquidators, and bank supervisory agencies varied, there was great
pressure to foreclose overdue mortgages, and the renewal of matur-
ing mortgages was frequently impossible. The net effect, of course,
was to depress real estate prices and to add to the force of cumu-
• lative economic contraction. To help meet these problems, the
HOLC established, in cooperation with the RFC, a "wholesale op-
eration." The RFC would make a loan to a bank in difficulty, accept-
ing mortgages as collateral; these were then processed by a special
staff of the HOLC which accepted those eligible and turned its bonds
or cash over to the bank, which in turn repaid the RFC.45 The
I-JOLC's wholesale organization also began to deal directly with the
receivers of closed financial institutions, on the ground that a mort-
gage held by such an institution could be presumed to be in distress
and could, in any case, qualify under the section of the Act authoriz-
ing refinancing of mortgages held by institutions in distress. Policy,
however, varied somewhat from state to state. In some cases proof of
inability to. refinance privately was required before a mortgage
would be taken over; in others all holdings were taken over en bloc.
45Wholesaleoperations were discussed publicly only in terms of closed institutions,
presumably to avoid casting suspicion on banks being helped to stay open.38 HISTORY AND POLICIES OF THE HOLC
By the end of 1934, when the operation was almost complete, a total
of 121,391 mortgage loans had been acquired from 6,316 closed finan-
cial institutions which had asked for help; $344 million had been
loaned.46 These loans made up about 13 percent of the number and
value o•:f all original loans. The majority were in Indiana, Louisiana,
Michigan, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. No data are available on loans
made to help bolster banks on the verge of closing. -
Thewholesale operation was criticized as using HOLC funds for
persons not in great need, but the HOLC maintained that all but a
minute fraction of the home owners aided directly by the wholesale
operation were themselves in real need. At the end of its lending
period, the HOLC had a large unutilized lending power, so that
wholesale operations could not have reduced over-all lending signifi-
cantly and may have had a considerable indirect effect in checking
deflationary forces.
CASH LOANS
The typical early discussion and publicity on the HOLC gave much
attention to the. need for cash loans. It was believed that some lend-
ers would refuse bonds, thereby unfairly denying help to needy bor-
rowers. Moreover, the problem facing some home owners was pri-
marily one of overdue taxes, which required cash to forestall tax
sales. Congress, and to some extent the Administration, seems to
have wanted to provide some means of helping in these cases, yet it
wanted to avoid making excessive cash lending commitments. It was
also anxious to discourage deliberate or avoidable defaults, a dan-
ger which it hoped to forestall by offering payment in bonds rather
than in cash. The final legislative compromises provided for cash
loans up to 40 percent of appraised value at 6 percent interest when
lenders would not take bonds and up to 50 percent of appraised value
for taxes, at 5 percent interest on otherwise unencumbered prop-
erty when there was only a tax lien on the property and when sale for
taxes was imminent.47
The Corporation to have discouraged applications for cash
loans, calling attention to its limits on cashresources on which there
46 Second Annual Report, Federal Home Loan Bank Board (December 31, 1934) pp.
83-84. Mortgages totaling over $400 million were taken from closed institutions; such
aid was, therefore, obviously not limited to wholesale operations. Sixth Annual Report,
Federal Home Loan Bank Board (June 30, 1938) p. 70.
47 June 13, 1933, c. 64, 48 Stat. 128, Sec. 4 (c) and 4 (f).ORIGINAL LENDING ACTIVITIES
were other important drains. Nevertheless, 1 1,305 such loans were
made—8,991 for taxes only and 2,314 for cash. The average loan
for taxes was oniy about $600; the average 40 percent cash loan was
$1,360.48 The demand for cash loans was doubtless reduced below
the expectations of the spring of 1933 by the strengthening of the
financial system and by the increasing willingness of lenders to ac-
cept FIOLC bonds. No data are available to compare the experience
of the cash loans with that of bond loans, but since the average cash
loan was smaller and the percentage of collateral greater, it is prob-
able that delinquencies were less frequent and losses small to the
point of nonexistence.
COST OF CLOSING LOANS
Of a total cost to the HOLC of $58.5million for closing loans, $40.1
million was attributed to loans that were closed and the balance,
$18.4 million, to applications that were rejected or withdrawn.49
The last-mentioned amount was generally absorbed by the HOLC,
though attempts were made in the early months by a few offices to re-
coup from the applicant. When loans were closed, however, the costs
were included in the face amount of the loan. The average cost per
loan closed was $39, and the average cost of each rejected or with-
drawn application was estimated at slightly over half as much—$2 1
(Table 7).Statevariations were wide. In Nevada, New Mexico, Ver-
mont, and the territories, the average cost of completing a loan was
over $70; the lowest average cost—$23—was in Indiana. In general,
costs in the Midwest, Southwest, and the Pacific regions were below
the national average, while costs in the Northeast and in the South
were above average. Differences were due in part to variations in
HOLC costs, such as salaries and overhead costs, in part to lower unit
costs of handling wholesale cases, and in part to differences in the
complexities of legal requirements in the various states.
48 These averages are based ondatacovering all cash loans closed through June 1935
—88 percent of the total.
49 For cases that were rejected the costs may include no allocated overhead.40 HISTORY AND POLICIES OF THE HOLC
TABLE 7— AVERAGECOST TO THE HOLC OF CLOSING LOANS AND HAN-
DLING REJECTED APPLICATIONS, BY STATE, JUNE 13, 1933-











New Mexico $86 $31 Kentucky $42 $18
Nevada 71 31 Oklahoma 41 19











Maine 60 32 Utah 39 21
Virginia 60 30 Alabama 38 23
West Virginia 60 30 Colorado 37 16
Dist. of Columbia59 26 Rhode Island 37 20
Mississippi 59 30 Wisconsin 37 21
New Hampshire58 25 Florida 36 20
Delaware 56. 21 Kansas 36 19
Montana 54 24 Arizona 35 17
North Dakota 54 24 Minnesota 35 20
Tennessee 54 28 Michigan 34 17
Arkansas 52 27 California 33 19
Connecticut 51 29 Missouri 33 15
North Carolina 50 21 Iowa 32 17
Wyoming 50 22 Texas 32 16
Nebraska 49 26 Washington 32 16
NewJersey 49 25 29 18
Georgia 48 29 Oregon 29 15
Massachusetts 48 26 South Dakota 27 14
NewYork 48 25 Indiana 23 11
Idaho 44 23 United Statesb$39 $21
a Datamade available by the HOLC.
b Includes Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico.